Rapid Top-Down Control of Behavior Due to Propositional Knowledge in Human Associative Learning.

Abstract

Propositional and associative processes have been proposed to explain human associative learning. Our main objective in this study was to evaluate whether propositional knowledge may gain control over behavior even under high time-pressure conditions, as suggested by propositional single-process models. In the experiment reported, different groups of participants had to learn a series of cue-outcome relationships on a trial-by-trial basis under different time pressure conditions. Later, a simple verbal instruction indicated that one of the cues had reversed its contingency (informed condition). The other cue had also changed its contingency, though in an unanticipated way (uninformed condition) whilst other contingencies did not change (no-change condition). The results showed that, in the absence of instructions, interference (i.e., uninformed vs. no-change effect) was greater in the high time than in the low time-pressure group. This result indicates that those responses which were previously relevant are more difficult to inhibit when there is little time to respond. However, time pressure had no detectable effect on the use of the verbal instruction, since an equivalent instruction advantage (i.e., uninformed vs. informed effect) was obtained in both time pressure groups. These results reveal that propositional knowledge can override those cue-outcome relationships that were learnt trial-by-trial even under conditions of high cognitive demand. This pattern of results is consistent with a propositional single-process model of associative learning.